Strategic Decision Analysis with Mrt Model free essay sample

For the period of thirteen days of October 1962, the leaders of both sides spent every single moment to tackle the situation when there was a higher-than-ever probability of 100 million Americans, over 100 million Russians, and millions of Europeans being killed. Given the probability of calamity which Anatoly Gribkov Soviet General and Army Chief of Operations estimated that â€Å"Nuclear catastrophe was hanging by a thread †¦ and we weren’t counting days or hours, but minutes†, (Wiersma Larson, 1997, p. 3) our escape seems like magic. It would be irrational, however, to call on magic when it comes to politics or military. The nuclear war being averted, the ultimate consequence of this event should be counted on the strategic decision of the two men, President John F. Kennedy and Premier Nikita Khrushchev. The process of making such decision has become a magnet for many researchers including political scientists, historians, students of government and participants in governance. There are many analyses of this issue from various perspectives relying on different models such as Rational Policy, Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics. As a case in point, the purpose of this paper is to present the understanding of the strategic decision-process made by the key players in this crisis. Nevertheless, due to the limits of time and space, the focus is on the U. S. point of view only. In other words, this paper will elucidate the decision-process used by President Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis by applying the MRT model. As prevalent features in human reasoning, certain cognitive biases during the process are also identified. Furthermore, the roles that information technology could have played in the crisis are discussed at the end of the paper as well. II. Decision-process analysis using the MRT model Let’s start with a brief introduction of the MRT model. It is a set of theories proposed by a group of authors, namely Henry Mintzberg, Duru Raisinghani, and Andre Theoret, which suggests a basic structure of â€Å"unstructured† decision processes. â€Å"This structure is described in terms of 12 elements: 3 central phases, 3 sets of supporting routines, and 6 sets of dynamic factors† (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, Theoret, 1976, p. 246). These elements will be investigated in turn along with the corresponding evidences from the Cuban Missile Crisis. The investigation will be summarized by a visualized model. 1. Central phase 1: The identification Phase This phase consists of two routines: decision recognition, where opportunities, problems, and crises are acknowledged and provoke decision activity; and diagnosis, in which the actor or the decision maker seeks to perceive the factors that stimulate the process and determin e cause-effect relationships for that particular decision situation (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, Theoret, 1976, p. 253). 1. 1. Decision Recognition Routine It can be told from the name â€Å"Cuban Missile Crisis† that the decision President Kennedy had to make in this situation is absolutely a crisis one. It is triggered by an astonishing disclosure that on October 15, 1962 the U. S. reconnaissance photographs by a U-2 revealed Soviet missiles under construction in Cuba. Early morning of the next day, President Kennedy was informed of the missile installations. This should be a severe deception to the President because it was just over a month earlier when Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin had assured Attorney General Robert Kennedy of no offensive missiles placement in Cuba. The discovery of this astounding revelation plays as a sudden and unequivocal stimulus that requires immediate attention and initiating the decision process. Perceiving the urgent of the situation, the President scheduled two meetings on that day to have a close-up at the U-2 findings and discussing how to respond to the challenge (JFK Library). Thus, October 16, 1962 marked the beginning of the thirteen days of the most dangerous period of the Cuban Missile Crisis. 1. 2. Diagnosis Routine The first step in the diagnosis routine is â€Å"tapping of existing information channels and the opening of new ones to clarify and define the issues† (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, Theoret, 1976, p. 254). This step is well-reflected through the two meetings on the first day of the crisis. In those meetings, all the photos of Soviet missile bases were readily on the President’s desk. The ballistic missiles the President was briefed on had a range of 1,100 miles and threatened major population centers in the U. S. including New York, Washington D. C. , and Philadelphia (Wiersma Larson, 1997, p. 9). From the additional films by the surveillance flights, they could estimate the number of Soviet-operated missiles (16 – 24) and these ones could well be operational within two weeks on very little notice. Americans could not sit still facing this apocalyptic vision. Also, the meeting attempted to determine the cause – effect relationships for the decision situation. As a consequence, Soviet’s insecurity on the missile gap between the U. S. and Soviet Union is considered to be the main cause of the crisis. The U. S. response to the situation could have great effect on not only the strategic nuclear balance but also the credibility of American commitment; particularly the President’s most solemn warning to his citizens and allies (Allison, 1969, p. 696). 3 2. Central phase 2: The Development Phase In this phase, a set of activities that leads to the development of one or more solutions to the decision situation is carried out. This set may be described in terms of two basic routines, search and design. 2. 1. Search routine â€Å"Search is evoked to find ready-made solutions† (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, Theoret, 1976, p. 255). Our specific situation, however, are without precedent in history. There was no possibility for a similar crisis happening elsewhere at that time either. Soviet and the U. S. were the only two superpowers that could have such kind of encounter. Thus, search routine was not supported in the President Kennedy’s decision-process. 2. 2. Design routine â€Å"Design is used to develop custom-made solutions or to modify ready-made ones. † (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, Theoret, 1976, p. 255). The development phase jumped to the use of design routine due to the absence of search. In this case, the first action taken is that the President assembled a crisis team consisting of trusted government officials to advise him in making strategic decisions during the crisis. This team was later referred to as the Executive Committee of the National Security Council or EX-COMM. The deliberation of upper echelons of government in this group produced three alternatives for the U. S. to choose: Diplomatic pressures to engage Fidel Castrol and Nikita Khrushchev in a diplomatic stage to resolve the crisis openly. Declaration of open surveillance combined with a naval blockade against offensive weapons entering Cuba. A â€Å"surgical† air strike against the missiles followed by an invasion. 3. Central phase 3: The Selection Phase The MRT model describes this phase in terms of screen, evaluation-choice, and authorization routines. 3. 1. Screen routine This routine is evoked when â€Å"search is expected to generate more ready-made alternatives than can be intensively evaluated†. However, in our case, search was not reported then neither was the screening. 3. 2. Evaluation-choice routine Among the possible three modes of this routine namely judgment, bargaining, and analysis, the use of judgment and analytic approach had clear evidences in the crisis. Through the judgment mode, the option of diplomatic pressures was turned down for being considered unlikely to succeed by most members of EXCOMM. The outlines of alternatives were quickly narrowed to two: an air strike and a blockade. At this point, â€Å"factual evaluation is carried out, generally by 4 technocrats, followed by managerial choice† (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, Theoret, 1976, p. 258). This proposition is demonstrated through the discussion in the EX-COMM from day 3 (October 17) to day 7 (October 21) of the crisis. After great concern on the coverage of the air strike as well as the possible casualties with his top advisors, the President finalized his decision by choosing the naval blockade to prevent the missiles from becoming fully operational. This decision was made publicly through the President’s speech to the nation on day 8 (October 22). 3. 3. Authorization routine â€Å"Authorization is sought for a completed solution, after final evaluation-choice† (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, Theoret, 1976, p. 259). In our case, basically, the President Kennedy – the decision maker – had the authority to commit the government to a course of action. There is still a trace of authorization which is the approval of the Organization of American States (OAS) on day 9 (October 23) as the final step in a formal procedure. 4. Supporting routine 1: Decision Control Routines Similar to the above elements, decision control comprises two basic routines: decision planning and switching. 4. 1. Decision planning For this routine, the decision maker â€Å"attempts to establish some preliminary bounds on the decision space† (Wiersma Larson, 1997, p. 15). In our specific situation, the President constantly concerned about the timing factor and the resources he is prepared to commit to produce the response to Soviet’s move. The act of assembling a crisis team to support his decision is a clear evidence of the President’s planning. A development strategy is also perceivable in his mind. The President â€Å"wanted to appear tough yet avoid a military confrontation† when taking a stance on Cuba and the Soviet Union (Wiersma Larson, 1997, p. 10). 4. 2. Switching routine In switching routine, the decision maker determines the next step to carry out. A good evidence for this is that after recognizing the severe crisis upon the U-2 findings, the President immediately scheduled two meetings to diagnose the situation. 5. Supporting routine 2: Decision Communication Routines Exploration, investigation, and dissemination are the three communication routines that can be delineated. . 1. Exploration routine If not to mention the resembling of the recognition routine, the exploration involves the general scanning for information to build conceptual models and to develop a general data base for decision making. In that case, it is much more 5 applicable to opportunity or milder problems than crisis situation. There w ere no such communication activities in our severe crisis. 5. 2. Investigation routine This routine is used to â€Å"find or confirm information during diagnosis, search, and evaluation-choice activities† (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, Theoret, 1976, p. 61). The mission of reconnaissance at both high and low level of the U. S. over Soviet missiles in Cuba; the meeting between the President Kennedy and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrie Gromyko are excellent evidence of investigation activities during the crisis. 5. 3. Dissemination routine Considering the number of persons involved or interested in the outcome of the President’s decision, disseminating information about the process’s progress is definitely a significant issue. For the highly uncertain effect of dissemination, the information was made publicly to Americans and the U. S. allies only after the President’s decision had been finalized. On day 8 (October 22), the President made a speech to address to the nation â€Å"a flurry of activity ensued† (Wiersma Larson, 1997, p. 14) in Cub a. His decision was informed to American allies and the U. S. Senate leaders on the same day as well. 6. Supporting routine 3: Political Routines Being considered as a key element in strategic decision making, this routine reflects the influence of internal and external political behaviors during the decision process. This can be elaborated by looking at the politics of choice made by the President. From the internal aspect, the emergence of a powerful coalition of advisers arguing for the blockade including McNamara, Robert Kennedy and Sorensen is an important factor. They are the ones in whom the President â€Å"had the greatest confidence, and with whom his style was most compatible† (Allison, 1969, p. 715). The possible external factor should come from the U. S. alliance. The President understood that most allies regarded Cuba as â€Å"a fixation of the United States and not a serious military threat† (Stern, 2003, p. 00) which meant that not just international community but many allies would see an air strike as a mad act in spite of the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba. 7. Dynamic factor 1: Interrupts Without unexpected constraints or new options, the specific decision-process in our case experienced a political impasse as an interrupt that caused temporary delay instead. Th is can be implied from the fact that when the President conceived the favor of the blockade, he still could not finalize the decision in the absence of a consensus among EX-COMM yet. There was still a considerable umber of advisors advocating the air strike. 8. Dynamic factor 2: Scheduling Delays 6 As a leader of a superpower, the President Kennedy had much more scheduled engagement and activities to get involved than anyone else. To maintain the secrecy of the issue, he still had to retain this hectic schedule which caused certain delay to the decision-process. 9. Dynamic factor 3: Feedback Delays There was an evidence of the feedback delays at the late stage of the crisis when the President had to wait for the Soviet’s reaction to the blockade’s activation. Considering the choice of naval quarantine alone, however, this was a unilateral decision and no action taken yet which meant that the decision maker did not have to await the results of other actors. Thus, no feedback delays were supported in this process. 10. Dynamic factor 4: Timing Delays and Speedups The time pressure in the crisis discouraged the occurrence of timing delays. The President along with his closest advisors tried their best to tackle the situation while well perceiving the limited time they had. The crisis decision producing vital outcomes would not support the speedups either. The President finalized his decision after ensuring great deliberation being done. 11. Dynamic factor 5: Comprehension Cycles The President cycled between selection and investigation (diagnosis) to comprehend the cost and the effectiveness of the air strike. 12. Dynamic factor 6: Failure Recycles The option of diplomatic pressures was rejected in evaluation-choice as having too low as pay off. Then the decision-process cycled back to the development phase with the discussion on the two other courses of action. 7 Identification Development Search Selection Screen Diagnosis Design Recognition Evaluation/Choice Authorise MRT model of the decision process to the crisis III. Identification of relevant cognitive biases within the decision-process Cognitive biases are cognition or mental behaviors that may prejudice decision quality. These entities can be viewed as predictable deviations from rationality (Arnott, 2006, p. 59). Being considered inherent in human reasoning, their occurrence is still being found in the President’s decision-process regardless of its great contribution to the amazing ultimate consequence. The following part of this session will identify such five cognitive biases along with their negative effects. 1. Anchoring and adjustment The anchoring factor in our case could be the President’s first impression on Soviet missile base installation. This originated in his September 4 statement in which the President had claimed the present of Soviet defensive missile in Cuba but stated that there were no offensive weapons. Moreover, Khrushchev had assured the President of that assertion as well. Therefore, the U-2 finding of Soviet’s building missile base in Cuba made the American president feel being badly deceived. Naturally, a startled anger would be his initial reaction which could play as an anchor to his judgment in the decision process. The proposition that Khrushchev’s deceitful move demanded a strong counter-move did affect the President’s initial preference which was taking out the missiles as soon as possible. If this perception had gone all the way to the final decision, in Robert Kennedy’s words, â€Å"the world might have been blown up† (Allison, 1969, p. 714). 8 2. Complexity Time pressure and other environment factors could increase the President’s perceived complexity of the situation. At the time of the crisis, John Kennedy was currently experiencing domestic political problems. Cuba was the Kennedy Administration’s â€Å"political Achilles’ heel. (Sorensen, as cited in Allison, 1969, p. 712). The finding of Khrushchev’s unhelpful act just not too far off the Congressional elections combining with the acknowledged time pressure during the week of deliberation made the burden of resolving the â€Å"utterly severe crisis† (JFK Library) seem hea vier to the American president. If that stress had not been assuaged by the support from advisors, his decision could have been negatively impacted under strain. 3. Attenuation The President Kennedy and other EX-COMM members simplified the situation by attenuating the probability of Soviet missile sites being operational already. Their discussion was founded on the premise that the missile warheads were not yet in Cuba and not attached to the missiles. This assumption supported the plan of carrying out any air strike prior to the time the missiles became operational. If they had chosen this action and the Soviet missiles had become operational before the air strike, there would have been â€Å"chaos in part of the east coast† (Mc Namara, as cited in JFK Library) which is the total reverse to what we expected and achieved at the end. 4. Escalation Being an air strike advocate from the beginning, the Joint Chiefs of Staff escalated â€Å"a previous unsatisfactory course of action† (Arnott, 2002, p. 11) which was known as Cuba I or the Bay of Pigs Invasion. This was an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the government of the Cuban dictator Fidel Castro. The Chiefs’ proposition was that the missiles provided the occasion to follow their contingency plans of cleansing the Western Hemisphere of Castro’s Communism. If their argument had dominated the discussion, the President’s decision could not have been the one we all know. . Completeness â€Å"McCone’s perceptions flowed from his confirmed prediction† (Allison, 1969, p. 714). As the first person acknowledging the incident, he argued that â€Å"the Soviets had installed the missiles in a daring political probe which the U. S. must meet with force† (Allison, 1969, p. 714). The findings on Soviet’s acts seemed to be logical and complete for his proposition without the need of further investigation on the actual motivation behind Khrushchev’s move. This behavior could have hindered the thorough vision on the issue to make a rational decision. 9 IV. Discussion on information technology’s possible roles in the case. Nowadays, we all acknowledge that information technology has developed and evolved dramatically to support decision making process from individual degree to organizational or even global extent. Unfortunately, that is not the case when looking back in time to the period of the crisis in 1962. If the President Kennedy and other players in the crisis had had access to today’s decision support technology, they would have reaped certain benefits. The most relevant technology for our situation could be communications-driven one.